Abstract. SMS4 is a 32-round block cipher with a 128-bit block size and a 128-bit user key. It is used in WAPI, the Chinese WLAN national standard. In this paper, we present a rectangle attack on 14-round SMS4, and an impossible differential attack on 16-round SMS4. These are better than any previously known cryptanalytic results on SMS4 in terms of the numbers of attacked rounds.
Introduction
best of our knowledge, the only previously published cryptanalytic result on the SMS4 algorithm is an integral attack [9] on 13-round SMS4, presented recently in [10] ; moreover, a differential fault analysis on the SMS4 implementation was presented in [16] .
In this paper, we exploit certain 12-round rectangle distinguishers with probability 2 −237.64 , which can be used to mount a rectangle attack on SMS4 reduced to 14 rounds. We also exploit certain 12-round impossible differentials, which enables us to mount an impossible differential attack on SMS4 reduced to 16 rounds. The attacks use the early abort technique described in [11, 12, 13] .
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we describe the notation used throughout this paper and the SMS4 cipher. In Section 3, we introduce a number of properties of SMS4 and give some necessary definitions. In Sections 4 and 5, we present our cryptanalytic results. Section 6 concludes this paper.
Preliminaries

Notation
We use the following notation throughout this paper. The notion of difference used throughout this paper is with respect to the ⊕ operation. It is assumed that the least significant bit of a 32-bit word is referred as the 0-th bit and the most significant bit is referred as the 31st bit.
The SMS4 Cipher
The SMS4 [1] block cipher takes as an input a 128-bit plaintext P , represented as four 32-bit words P = (P 0 , P 1 , P 2 , P 3 ), and has a total of 32 rounds. Let X i+1 = (X i+1,0 , X i+1,1 , X i+1,2 , X i+1,3 ) denote the four-word output of the i-th round, (0 ≤ i ≤ 31) 1 . Then, the encryption procedure of SMS4 is as follows:
1. Set X 0 = (X 0,0 , X 0,1 , X 0,2 , X 0,3 ) = (P 0 , P 1 , P 2 , P 3 ). 2. For i = 0 to 31: 0x0 0x1 0x2 0x3 0x4 0x5 0x6 0x7 0x8 0x9 0xa 0xb 0xc 0xd 0xe 0xf 0x0 d6 90 e9 f e cc e1 3d b7 16 b6 14 c2 28 f b 2c 05 0x1 2b 67 9a 76 2a be 04 c3 aa 44 
The ciphertext is
where RK i is the 32-bit round subkey for the i-th round, the transformation L is defined as
2 , and the transformation S applies the same 8 × 8 bijective S-Box (see Table 1 ) four times in parallel to an input, and it is defined as follows.
The composed transformation L • S is called T in the specification document [1] . Fig. 1 depicts one encryption round of SMS4. Decryption is identical to encryption, except that the round keys are used in the reverse order.
The key schedule of SMS4 accepts a 128-bit user key MK , represented as four 32-bit words (MK 0 , MK 1 , MK 2 , MK 3 ). The j-th round subkey RK j (0 ≤ j ≤ 31) is generated as follows.
, where FK 0 = 0xa3b1bac6, FK 1 = 0x56aa3350, FK 2 = 0x677d9197, and FK 3 = 0xb27022dc.
2 , and the constant
2 ) 4 , with ck j,k = 28j +7k mod 256 (k = 0, 1, 2, 3). The composed transformation L •S is called T in the specification document.
Properties of SMS4 and Definitions
We first introduce three properties of SMS4, which are important to our attacks. 
Note that |Ω(e Λ )| = 1 holds for any nonempty Λ by Property 3.
Definition 2. Let Λ be an arbitrary but nonempty subset of the set {0, 1, · · · , 31}; then we define the three sets Θ(e Λ ), Υ (e Λ , m ∈ Θ(e Λ )) and Π(e Λ , m ∈ Θ(e Λ ), n ∈ Υ (e Λ , m)) as follows:
4 Rectangle Attack on 14-Round SMS4
Being a variant of the boomerang attack [15] and an improvement of the amplified boomerang attack [8] , the rectangle attack [4] shares the same basic idea of using two short differentials with larger probabilities instead of a long differential with a smaller probability. A rectangle attack is based on a rectangle distinguisher, which treats a block cipher E : {0, 
where Φ is an arbitrary but nonempty subset of any of the four sets {0,
See Table 2 for the details of these two groups of differentials, where the difference in a round is the input difference to this round. The same meaning is used with the differentials in the next section. Note that different Ψ and/or Φ correspond to different rectangle distinguishers. In the following, we assume Ψ and Φ are fixed. Table 2 . The two groups of differentials in the 12-round rectangle distinguisher, where † means that the probability is addressed later
In the following, we need to sum the square of the probabilities of all the possible differentials α → β . As there exist many more differential characteristics than we can count, it is infeasible to compute the exact square sum; however, we can compute a lower bound for it. By the Property 3 in Section 3, we can learn that for a fixed Ψ , there exists one e Ψ 2 such that the probability that L(S(∆e Ψ )) → ∆e Ψ2 is 2 −6 , and exist 126 e Ψ2 such that the probability that L(S(∆e Ψ )) → ∆e Ψ2 is 2 −7 . Due to the L transformation, the four 32-bit words in any e Ψ are all nonzero. Thus, for any e Ψ 2 , if we define the Event A: (L(S(∆e Ψ 2 ))⊕ e Ψ ) → ∆e Ψ 3 , then we can learn that there exists one possible e Ψ 3 with probability 2 −24 , and exist As mentioned in the Introduction, our rectangle attack, as well as the impossible differential attack in the next section, uses the early abort technique introduced in [11, 12, 13] ; the main idea of the early abort technique is to partially determine whether or not a candidate quartet in a rectangle attack (or a candidate pair in an impossible differential attack) is valid earlier than usual, by guessing only a small fraction of subkeys required; if not, we can discard it immediately, which results in less computations in the left steps and may allow us to break more rounds by guessing the subkeys involved, depending on how many candidates are remaining.
The attack procedure is as follows. 
Attack Procedure
120.82 . We only choose those such that both C i1 ⊕ C i2 and C i1 ⊕ C i2 belong to {(e Φ , e Φ2 , e Φ3 , e Φ4 )|e Φ3 ∈ Υ (e Φ , e Φ2 ), e Φ4 ∈ Π(e Φ , e Φ2 , e Φ3 )}. 
For all the remaining quartets ((C
with RK 13,j to get the j-th bytes of their intermediate values just after the S transformation in Round 13; we denote them by (( −i ] ≈ 0.8, therefore, with a success probability of 80%, this related-key rectangle attack can break 14-round SMS4, faster than an exhaustive key search.
Impossible Differential Attack on 16-Round SMS4
An impossible differential [2] is a differential [5] with a zero probability; that is, it would never happen under any situation.
In this section, we exploit certain 12-round impossible differentials in SMS4. Finally, we show that impossible differential cryptanalysis can break SMS4 reduced to 16 rounds.
12-Round Impossible Differentials
The 12-round impossible differentials are (e Γ , e Γ , e Γ , 0) (0, e Γ , e Γ , e Γ ), where Γ is defined as an arbitrary but nonempty subset of the set {0, 1, · · · , 15}. These 12-round impossible differentials are built in a miss-in-the-middle manner [3] : a 6-round differential with probability 1 is concatenated with another 6-round differential with probability 1, but the intermediate differences of these two differentials contradict one another. See Table 3 . Table 3 . The two 6-round differentials in the 12-round impossible differentials, where The first 6-round differential with probability 1 is (e Γ , e Γ , e Γ , 0) → (e Γ , ?, ?, ?). The input difference (e Γ , e Γ , e Γ , 0) to Round 0 propagates with probability 1 to the difference (e Γ , e Γ , 0, e Γ ) after one round, which then propagates with a 1 probability to the difference (0, e Γ , e Γ , e Γ ) after the following two rounds. Then, the difference (0, e Γ , e Γ , e Γ ) definitely propagates to a difference belonging to the set {(e Γ , e Γ , e Γ , x 1 )|x 1 ∈ Θ(e Γ )} after Round 3, which finally propagates with probability 1 to a difference belonging to {(e Γ , x 1 , 1 , y 1 )} after Rounds 4 and 5. On the other hand, when we roll back the output difference (0, e Γ , e Γ , e Γ ) of the second 6-round differential through the three consecutive rounds from Rounds 9 to 11 in the reverse direction, we will get the difference (e Γ , e Γ , e Γ , 0) just before Round 9 with probability 1. Then, when we roll back the difference (e Γ , e Γ , e Γ , 0) through Round 8, we will definitely get a difference belonging to the set {(x 2 , e Γ , e Γ , e Γ )| x 2 ∈ Θ(e Γ )}. Finally, when we continue to go back for two more rounds, we can definitely get a difference belonging to the set {(z 2 , y 2 , x 2 , e Γ )| x 2 ∈ Θ(e Γ ), y 2 ∈ Υ (e Γ , x 2 ), z 2 ∈ Π(e Γ , x 2 , y 2 )} just before Round 6. Now, a contradiction occurs, for we never get the one-round output difference {(y 2 , x 2 , e Γ , e Γ )| x 2 ∈ Θ(e Γ ), y 2 ∈ Υ (e Γ , x 2 )} given an input difference belonging to {(e Γ , x 1 , y 1 , z 1 x 1 , y 1 ) }. More specifically, to get a one-round output difference belonging to {(y 2 , x 2 , e Γ , e Γ )| x 2 ∈ Θ(e Γ ), y 2 ∈ Υ (e Γ , x 2 )}, the input difference of the second 6-round differential should belong to the set {(z 2 , y 2 , x 2 , e Γ )| x 2 ∈ Θ(e Γ ), y 2 ∈ Υ (e Γ , x 2 ), z 2 ∈ Π(e Γ , x 2 , y 2 )}, however, note that the output difference of the first 6-round differential is {(e Γ , x 1 , y 1 , x 1 , y 1 )}, so it is a necessary that the following five conditions should hold for some sextuple (x 1 , y 1 , z 1 , x 2 , y 2 , z 2 ) , where
By Properties 1 and 2 in Section 3, we can learn that Eq. (5) is equivalent to the following equation:
We perform a computer search over all the possibilities that may satisfy Eqs. (1)- (4) and (6), but find that there does not exist such a qualified sextuple (x 1 , y 1 , z 1 , x 2 , y 2 , z 2 ) for any nonempty subset Γ of the set {0, 1, · · · , 15}. Thus, these 12-round impossible differentials are impossible.
Before further proceeding, we would like to give the following two remarks: i) We did not check whether there also exist similar 12-round impossible differentials if Γ is defined as an arbitrary but nonempty subset of the set {0, 1, · · · , 31} (excluding those described above), for this is much more time-consuming due to a sharp increase on the number of the possible differences. It is reasonably thought that there also exist similar 12-round impossible differentials for them. ii) We did not check whether one or more of the 12-round impossible differentials can be extended to 13-round impossible differentials by appending one-round differential (e Γ , x 1 , y 1 , z 1 ) → (x 1 , y 1 , z 1 , ?) after the first 6-round differential or one-round differential (?, z 2 , y 2 , x 2 ) → (z 2 , y 2 , x 2 , e Γ ) before the second 6-round differential; as there are so many possibilities (some may be identical) for any Γ that we do not have an enough powerful computer/workstation on our hands to check these possibilities with a bearable running time.
We can use a 12-round impossible differential to conduct an impossible differential attack on SMS4 reduced to 16 rounds, by taking advantage of the early abort technique introduced in [13] . We assume the attacked 16 rounds are from Rounds 0 to 15. To reduce the data and time complexities of the attack, we choose Γ = {0, 1, · · · , 15}. We use the 12-round impossible differential from Rounds 2 to 13. Given the output difference (e 0,1,···,15 , e 0,1,···,15 , e 0,1,···,15 , 0) of Round 1, there are 127 2 possible input differences to Round 1, and at most 127 6 possible input differences to Round 0; we denote them by the set Σ 1 . Given the input difference (0, e 0,1,···,15 , e 0,1,···,15 , e 0,1,···,15 ) to Round 14, there are at most 127 2 possible output differences just after Round 14, and at most 127 6 possible output differences just after Round 15; we denote them by the set Σ 2 . The attack procedure is as follows. 4. For a recorded guess of the 96 subkey bits, we can deduce that there are at most 2 96 possible 128-bit user keys from these two 32-bit subkeys. Then, we do a trial encryption with one known pair of plaintext and ciphertext. If a 128-bit key is suggested, output it as the user key of the 16-round SMS4; otherwise, go to Step 2-(a).
Attack Procedure
To get the difference (0, e 0,1,···,15 , e 0,1,···,15 , e 0,1 
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we analyse the security of the SMS4 block cipher used in WAPI, a Chinese national standard. We present a rectangle attack on SMS4 reduced to 14 rounds and an impossible differential attack on SMS4 reduced to 16 rounds. These are better than any previously known cryptanalytic results on SMS4 in terms of the numbers of attacked rounds. Like most cryptanalytic results on block ciphers, our attacks are theoretical in the sense of the assumptions of differential cryptanalysis. We stress that our cryptanalytic attacks do not endanger the full 32 round version of SMS4; the 32 rounds provide a sufficient safety margin against our attacks.
